The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code promised to democratize distressed asset acquisition when it launched in 2016. A decade later, four conglomerates control nearly 25% of all admitted claims under the corporate insolvency resolution process.
Adani, JSW, Reliance, and Tata acquired companies representing approximately ₹3.25 trillion of the total ₹13 trillion in admitted claims as of December 2025, according to the LiveMint analysis. The concentration sits awkwardly against the IBC’s original pitch of creating a competitive marketplace for distressed assets.
The regulatory design included provisions meant to prevent concentration. Section 29A of the IBC bars connected persons and willful defaulters from bidding [VERIFY]. The committee of creditors must evaluate resolution plans on commercial viability, not bidder identity. Yet the math tells a different story.
What emerges from this data is a tale of two markets. The IBC created liquidity in distressed assets, processing cases that might have lingered in courts for decades. But it also created scale advantages that favor players with deep balance sheets and established relationships with creditor institutions.
Large conglomerates can structure complex bids, absorb integration costs, and navigate lengthy approval processes. Smaller bidders often lack the financial engineering capacity or risk tolerance for multi-thousand-crore acquisitions with uncertain timelines. The result is a functional market that operates within a narrow participant base.
The concentration raises questions about the broader policy objective. If the IBC was meant to maximize recovery for creditors, the numbers suggest success. If it was meant to redistribute industrial assets more broadly, the evidence points elsewhere. Four groups now control assets that were previously scattered across dozens of independent companies.
From a governance perspective, this consolidation creates new oversight challenges. These conglomerates are adding distressed companies with existing compliance gaps, legacy liabilities, and operational issues. The acquired entities often require significant governance overhauls, new board structures, and risk management systems.
My Boardroom Takeaway: Directors at acquiring companies should scrutinize post-acquisition governance integration plans more closely. The IBC process may clear legal hurdles, but it doesn’t address underlying compliance weaknesses or cultural mismatches. Nomination committees might consider whether boards have adequate expertise to oversee rapid inorganic expansion, particularly when acquired assets come with historical governance deficits. The concentration trend suggests these integration challenges will only multiply.